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CIPS II workshop on research projects
financed under the CIPS specific
programme
1 Background and purpose of the Workshop
The specific programme “Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management
of Terrorism and Security related risks”, part of the General Programme on Security and
Safeguarding Liberties, provides financial support for operational cooperation and coordi-
nation actions (strengthening networking, mutual confidence and understanding, develop-
ing contingency plans, exchanging and disseminating information, experiences and best
practices).
The programme activities cover both prevention and preparedness, particularly by
improving the protection of critical infrastructures and consequence management to en-
sure the smooth coordination of crisis management and security actions, in particular
regarding terrorist attacks. The budget for the CIPS funding scheme is 140 MEuro for
the period 2007-2013. JRC activities supporting DG HOME in the implementation of the
EPCIP are also financed by the CIPS funding scheme. JRC has a long history in support-
ing DG HOME and in organising similar events. The first CIPS conference was organised
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in Rome in 2011, a series of Directive Implementation and Application workshops have
taken place since 2009 as well as supporting events such as the Risk Assessment and Re-
silience workshop that took place in Ispra in April 2012. As a consequence JRC organised
on the 22-23 of November the second workshop on CIPS funded projects.
The aim of this workshop is to bring closer research institutes that are financed
by the CIPS scheme, national and European authorities and policy makers in order to
exchange views on hot topics in the domain of research for critical infrastructures protec-
tion. In addition, it is an important event to demonstrate main achievements up to now
for selected CIPS projects. The selected projects are financed by the CIPS Annual Work
Programme (AWP) 2010 and 2011. These projects have usually a duration of 24 months
(although certain projects are financed for shorter periods). Considering that projects fi-
nanced by previous AWPwere already presented in the first CIPS, it was clear that projects
from 2010-2011 AWP should be presented in order to provide to the participants the latest
developments in the domain of security research and Critical Infrastructures Protection.
The selection was based on the following criteria:
• Projects with a European dimension covering the maximum possible extent of op-
erators and having an international dimension and significant impact to the EU in
general
• Projects with an innovative concept
• Projects with strong potential for providing solutions to the end users
• Projects that address issues related to the upcoming EPCIP policy package and the
main topics that have been discussed during the review process such as interdepen-
dencies, risk assessment and resilience.
• Projects with cross-sectoral dimension.
4
Proceedings of the CIPS II Workshop
In general the projects that have been financed by AWP 2011 are still in a prelim-
inary phase. For these projects this workshop was an opportunity to receive feedback in
order to streamline research activities. Projects financed by AWP 2010 were in a more
mature phase, thus more tangible results could be provided to the participants.
2 Future meetings
Taking into account the participants feedback such events are useful for both policy
makers and researchers in order to improve the communication between these communi-
ties. In addition, the CIPS funding scheme provides an excellent opportunity to support
projects that are tailored to the CIP domain and may provide innovative solutions for the
policy makers. The intention is to continue organising these events on an annual basis.
This will allow to obtain the latest developments in the domain of research and steer in
a more efficient way ongoing projects towards achieving the high-level objectives of the
EPCIP.
3 Annexes
• CIPS II Workshop agenda
• List of Participants
• Critical Infrastructure Simulation of Advanced Models on Interconnected Networks
resilience
• Business Continuity Planning for Critical Infrastructures
• Security Risk Management Processes for Road Infrastructures
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• Development Of a Risk Assessment methodology to Enhance security Awareness
in ATM
• Critical ICT Infrastructures Simulation of Interdependency Model II
• Online identification of Failure and Attack on interdependent Critical Infrastruc-
tures
• Threat-Vulnerability Path Identification for Critical Infrastructures Compilation of
a comprehensive all-hazards catalogue for critical infrastructure
• Risk Assessment and Development of Protection Capacity for Critical Infrastruc-
tures due to Aircraft Attack
• RAPID-N: A tool for mapping Natech risk due to earthquakes
• Development of a Risk Assessment and Resilience analysis platform by the JRC
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CIPS II Workshop agenda
JRC Ispra, 22-23 November 2012
The CIPS projects are financed by DG HOME within 
the framework of the specific programme «Prevention, 
Preparedness and Consequence Management of 
Terrorism and other Security related risks» 




The mission of the Joint Research Centre is to provide 
customer-driven scientific and technical support for 
the conception, development, implementation and 
monitoring of European Union policies. As a service 
of the European Commission, the Joint Research 
Centre functions as a reference centre of science and 
technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making 
process, it serves the common interest of the Member 
States, while being independent of special interests, 
whether private or national.
Joint Research Centre 
The European Commission’s in-house scientific service
European Commission
Joint Research Centre (JRC)
External Communication Unit
Brussels Tel.: +32 2 299 02 66
  Fax: +32 2 299 63 22
Ispra  Tel.: +39 0332 78 98 89




























Registration and welcome to the JRC
G. Giannopoulos, Joint Research Centre
9:30
10:15
Critical Infrastructure Simulation of   
Advanced Models on Interconnected   
Networks resilience
R. Onori, «Sapienza» University of Rome
10:15
11:00
Business Continuity Planning for Critical   
Infrastructures





Security Risk Management Processes for   
Road Infrastructures




Development Of a Risk Assessment   





Critical ICT Infrastructures Simulation of 
Interdependency Model – II





Online identification of Failure and Attack  
on interdependent Critical Infrastructures,
R. Setola, , Universita degli Studi Roma Tre
16:00
16:45
Threat-Vulnerability Path Identification   
for Critical Infrastructures Compilation of 
a comprehensive all-hazards catalogue for 
critical infrastructure





Risk Assessment and Development of   
Protection Capacity for Critical    
Infrastructures due to Aircra Attack
F. O. Henkel, Wölfel Beratende Ingenieure
9:45
10:30
RAPID-N: A risk assessment tool for   
natural hazards and chemical critical   
infrastructure






Development of a Risk Assessment and   
Resilience analysis platform by the JRC
G. Giannopoulos, B. Dorneanu, O. Jonkeren
Joint Research Centre
12:30 
14:00 End of Workshop
All participants have to register through the 
following link until 10 of November:
https://jrc-meeting-registration.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
The  meeting will be held in:
JRC – Ispra, Building 58c, Auditorium
Airports in Milan are:
Milano Malpensa and Milano Linate
Local transports:
Transport from and to these airports and from 
and to the agreed hotels will be organized by 
JRC.
Hotel rooms have been pre-booked in the area. 
Please register by November 13th to secure a 
hotel room. 





For organizational issues please contact:
Ms. Laurence Campé :
+39 0332 785032
Laurence.CAMPE@ec.europa.eu
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Influence diagram for cascading effects of infectious disease through critical infrastructures. 
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•  Definition and Objectives, 
•  BUCOPCI as part of the CIPS programme 





































































































•  Work Breakdown Structure 
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•  Where are we and where are we going to? 
•  Phase 1 - Results obtained. 
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Development Of a Risk Assessment





With the financial support of the CIPS Programme  
EC – DG Home Affairs 
Outline 
  Partnership 
  DORATHEA Project 
  A new methodology 
 Founded in 1990, SESM is a private 
research centre owned by  
 SELEX Sistemi Integrati (world leader in 
the design and development of innovative 
solutions to ensure efficiency and safety in 
Air, Airport and Coastal Traffic Management) 
and 
 SELEX Galileo (world leader in defence 
electronics markets, with a distinctive 
strength in airborne mission critical systems 
and homeland security applications).  
 SESM is part of Finmeccanica Group, 
based in Naples (HQ) and Rome. 
 SESM’s research activities focus on the 
development of information solutions by 
adopting state-of-art information and 




 SESM operates in the design and 
development of Decision Support and 
Knowledge Based Systems. 
 SESM has 120 employees, most of them 
research engineers.  
 SESM main domain of activities are: 
 Middleware and Open-Source for mission-
critical systems 
 Interoperability for Air Traffic Management 
and  Crisis Management  
 Security and Dependability for Embedded 
Sy s t ems c e r t i f i c a t i o n and C r i t i c a l 
Infrastructure protection 
 Radar Tracking and Data Fusion for 
surveillance systems 




 Multinational conglomerate founded in 1984 
 Offices in Spain, Portugal, Poland, USA, Germany, 
Romania, Malaysia, and India 
 Permanent staff in 10 countries 
 
$140M 










 GMV has deep knowledge in key technologies for Aeronautics: 
 CNS / ATM Technologies and Data Fusion 
 Airport Security Systems Integration 
 Flight Physics & Control Techniques implementation 
 GNSS/INS navigation systems development 
 Embedded Systems (SW/HW) & Integrated Modular Avionics, IMA 
 Safety Critical Software and Certification 
 Aircraft Simulation 
 Combined with Defence technologies: 
 Communication systems 
 C4I and ISTAR systems 
 SIGINT 
 Reference Clients include 
 AENA, Eurocontrol,  
Airbus Military, Embraer, Thales, EADS, … 
Introduction to DORATHEA 
 
  Call for proposals: CIPS 2010 – DG HOME 
  Registration number: HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/030 
  Name of the Applicant organisation: SESM Scarl (Italy) 
  Partners/co-beneficiaries: GMV SKYSOFT, S.A. 
(Portugal) 
  Duration of the project: 24 months 
  Total eligible costs (EUR): 572.028,92 




DORATHEA is related to the ATM CI Protection 
Security in ATM 
  ICAO’s Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Application 
  helps in identifying and prioritising threats according to time and 
budget constraints. 
  It is more related to the Airport Security Management and 
Airborne Security. 
  New guidelines comes from SESAR (SWP 16.2) 
  The out-coming methodology is mostly based on the definition 
of security cases 
  It is limited to the operative context of SESAR. 
 
A Common Methodology for the Security 
Risk Assessment of ATM-CI 
needs to be defined 
DORATHEA’s Objectives (1/2) 
  The objective of DORATHEA is the development of a 
common methodology for carrying out risk, threat and 
vulnerability assessments for ATM Critical Infrastructures 
(ATM-CI) protection.  
  Why is it important to develop a common methodology for 
the Security Risk Assessment of ATM-CI? 
  To have a coherent implementation of measures to protect 
European ATM critical infrastructure  
  To clearly define the respective responsibilities of all relevant 
stakeholders.  
DORATHEA’s Objectives (2/2) 
The security risk assessment methodology developed in 
DORATHEA will: 
  extend and be consistent with consolidate standards 
already in usage 
  address either new ATM-CI system as well as legacy system 
and assess the risk deriving from their connection 
  give effective guidance to identify protection measures. 
  be proposed as a common security baseline for all EU 
ATM systems 
WHY CIPS? 
  The methodology will be developed and validated through 
interviews and workshops with key players.  
  SESM and GMV will carry out the former activities, assisted by 
Project Advisory Committee (PAC).  
  The Target Group (TG) will be involved to achieve the 









  Jenuary 2013 in Bruxelles 
  Vulnerabilities assessment 
  June 2013 in Rome 
  Countermeasures identification 
  December 2013 in Lisbon 
  Final public dissemination 
DORATHEA Methodology -  
 Innovative aspects 
  Identification of vulnerabilities  
  will take into account weak points that will arise from the 
integration of legacy ATM systems and new ATM system 
  Threats analysis 
  will explore possible connection or threat propagation from 
other ATM subsystems 
  Risk assessment 
  will produce a quantitative and qualitative measure of the 
risk 
  Identification of countermeasures 
  will propose enhancements to the ATM security 
 
DORATHEA Methodology -   
A SAM for Security 
   Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is a guideline that 
became a standard de facto well before EC Regulations put 
into force ESARRs.  
  It preserves the distinction of roles and responsibilities: 
  ANSPs, responsible for operations, have the first and the last 
word 
  Stakeholders, who have the knowledge of equipment, have to 
identify Safety Requirements.  
  There is the need for a security methodology similar to 
SAM, in which to ANSPs is left the responsibility to identify 
Security Objectives, starting from the knowledge of 
operational environment.  
Security Assessment Process 
HOW SECURE DOES THE 
SYSTEM NEED TO BE 
TO ACHIEVE A TOLERABLE 
RISK? 
IS THE PROPOSED 
ARCHITECTURE 
EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE 
A TOLERABLE RISK? 
DOES THE SYSTEM AS 
IMPLEMENTED 


















Security Assessment is the mean of providing assurance that  
a system is secure for operational use. 
Functional Vulnerability Analysis (1/2) 
  ANSPs have the responsibility of this phase. 
  For each identified vulnerability the Security 
Objective specifies the maximum tolerable likelihood 
of its occurrence, given its assessed severity. 
 
A definition of Security Risk is needed 
  Safety Risk = Pe * Ph * Sc 
  Threat is the Event that triggers the Vulnerability, which 
corresponds to a Hazard. 
  Vulnerability corresponds to loss or corruption of 
functionalities, which occur when a Threat is in place. 
  Security Risk = Lt * Lv * Sc 
  Through a functional analysis, ANSPs have to identify 
potential security incidents.  
  Through the security risk matrix, Likelihood can be fixed, 
according to the known Severity. 
  

















Catastrophic      
II  
Hazardous      
III 
Major      
IV 
Minor       
V 
No Effect      
Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable 
Functional Vulnerability Analysis (2/2) 
Preliminary System  
Security Assessment 
  Stakeholders have the responsibility of this phase. 
  Through a Threat Tree Analysis (functional analysis) and 
a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (physical analysis), 
elementary threats can be identified. 
  For each relevant threat, one or more security controls 
have to be identified.  
  These security controls can be traced to System 
Requirements to become Security Requirements. 
System Security Assessment 
  Stakeholders have to demonstrate the correct 
implementation of security controls. 
  Security metrics are introduced:  
  SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Repeatable, Time-
dependent 
  Measurement enables improvement: Security metrics is to 
improve the maturity and effectiveness of the overall security 
program, while demonstrating cost-effectiveness.  
  Verification of Security Requirements. 
Development strategy 
  Evaluate the state of the art of the risk assessment methodology 
for ATM-Ground and Air-Ground systems by the study of 
literature, standards and rules 
  Create functional models of the systems used in the ATM by 
interviews with stakeholder 
  Develop the methodology on the basis of the results of previous 
activities 
  Identify and classify security vulnerabilities by the application of 
the methodology and the results of workshop and interviews 
  Identify and classify security threats by the application of the 
methodology and the defined models 
  Identify security countermeasures by the application of the 
methodology and results of workshop and interviews 
  Validate the methodology and refine/improve it by interviews 
with regulators 
Scenario of validation 
  Airport air-side  
  Selection of phases of gate-to-gate cycle: 
  Approaching 
  Landing 
  Routing on the ground 
  Parking 
  Push-back 
  Routing toward runways 
  Holding before entering runways 
  Take-off 
  The above phases involve the use of data-link, 
communication, A-SMGCS systems, etc.. 
  Main actors involved are: ATC, Pilots and Airlines, Airport 
Authorities. 
  Security Risks are “relevant”, many systems involved. 
What after DORATHEA? 
  SESM and GMV will extensively apply the 
methodology to EU and national projects, thereby 
the methodology will be consolidated.  
  After the end of the project the vulnerabilities and 
threats identified for the different ATM systems will 
be stored in a database that represents a 
“knowledge base”. 
  
  The knowledge base will collect valuable information 
to: 
  open new research activities  
  evaluate the evolution of security awareness 
  improve countermeasures.  
  SESM and GMV will push the methodology to make  
   it a standard at EU level.  
Contact details 
SESM Scarl 
Via Circumvallazione Esterna – Loc. Pontericcio 
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Critical ICT Infrastructures Simulation
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Online identification of Failure and
Attack on interdependent Critical
Infrastructures
Roberto Setola
Universita degli Studi Roma3
email: r.setola@unicampus.it




online identification of Failure and Attack 
on interdependent Critical 
InfrastructurES
Associated partner:
Start: 1st September, 2012
End: 28th February, 2014
With the financial support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management 
of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme
European Commission - Directorate-General Home Affairs
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
FACIES partners
University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome (Italy)
Complex Systems and Security Lab –COSERITY Lab
University of Malaga (Spain)
Network, Information and Computer Security Lab – NICS Lab
RadioLabs (Italy)
Consortium Universities-Companies – RadioCommunication
Laboratories
University of Cyprus (Cyprus)
KIOS Research Center for Intelligent Systems and Networks
AIIC (Italy)
Italian Association of Critical Infrastructures’ experts
Associated partner:






UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Objective of the project
The objective of FACIES project is to define cooperation
strategies for automatic detection of failures and attacks.
The solution has to be achieved in a decentralized and
peer-to-peer perspective where only partial and not
sensible data are shared among the different subjects.
A particular attention will be posed on cyber threats and
stealth attacks.
The project aims to illustrate the feasibility on a (hydric)
reference scenario implemented via testbed.
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Motivation for fault diagnosis
• Critical Infrastructures are sophisticated system 
dispersed on large geographical area with a large 
number of components and subparts
• Huge data of different characteristics (in time and 
space)
• Advanced data processing and automated decision 
making
• However, data may be faulty, inconsistent or 
missing (nonsense data) 
• Faulty data may result in wrong decisions or 
escalation to a failure
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
FAULT DETECTION
Are a set of techniques devoted to automatically identify anomaly
behavior (e.g. fault) into a process system
The main idea is those to constantly compare the output of the actual
system (the plant) with those foreseen by a mathematical/simulated
model of the system (the estimator) . The presence of large discrepancies
indicate the existence of a fault
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
FAULT DETECTION
• Fault detection (There has been a fault)
• Fault isolation (there has been a fault of a specific type)
• Fault accomodation (how to reconfigure the system to be
trasparent w.r.t the fault)
To early detect a fault and prevent “small” fault events 
from escalating into a major failure 
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Detectability Conditions
 Generally only a very limited set of measure are 
available
 Our knowledge (mathematical model) of the process 
is not perfect
 In order to be recognise a «fault» has to detectable 
(i.e. have to be observable from our measuremets)
There is always a tradeoff between the detection capabilities (# 
of not recognized event – positive false) and the robustness of 
the approach (# of erroneous alarm – false positive) 
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Fault Isolation schema
 We need to have a model of the “modus-operandi” of 







        Estimator
and Approximation
   Bank  of  Fault
Decision  Scheme
Activation
Fault Detection and Isolation Architecture
  Fault  Detection
 Fault  Isolation
      Fault  Detection
Isolation Estimators
   u
       Nonlinear  Plant    x
Alarm
Identification of the
fault that has occurred
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Moving from system to infrastructure
• Local Faults
• Distributed Faults
• Distributed Faults with Overlapping Signature
• Propagating Faults 
Types of FAULT ISOLATION:
• identify the type of fault that has occurred
• identify the physical location of the fault
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
Example: Water Distribution Networks
Objective: control the spatio-temporal distribution of drinking water
disinfectant throughout the network by the injection of appropriate   
amount of disinfectant at suitably 
chosen actuator locations.
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
FAULT DETECTION
Quite all the Critical Infrastructure has such type of system
(labbed in different way as estimator, bada data detector, etc.)
to help operators to better monitoring their system  
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The comlpexity of the problem is increasing
Classical infrastructure 
have been designed as tree 
like structure 




propagation of the fault)
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The comlpexity of the problem is increasing
I can easily identify 
the “root” of the 
failure and the 
corresponding cause-
effect phenomena 
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The comlpexity of the problem is increasing
Due to deregulation any 
infrastructure is now managed by 
several operators each one has a 
partial view of the whole process
Operator #1
Operator #2
No one has a 
complete picture of 
the whole system
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The comlpexity of the problem is increasing
Due to interdipendence, we have a 
graph structure (instaed of a tree). 
It s pssible to have loop 











Each operator can monitor its own domain, but 
he have to accommodate for  phenomena that 
are generated outside
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The comlpexity of the problem is increasing
All data have to be collected via ICT (also internet), fault 
may happen also in the communication link and/or SW and 
one has to consider also cyber attack
SCADA
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The experience of the US and Canada blackout
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The cyber threat
 A DDoS attack can block the communication (e.g. 
slammer worm)
 A virus/worm may block the server (e.g. slammer 
worm)
 A virus/worm may modify the normal behaviour of 
the process control (e.g. stuxnet)
 An hacker can introduce into the system and modify 
the data (data corruption)
But also  
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
The cyber threat 2
The cyber action can be targeted to the fault detection 
system with the aim of:
 Induce false alarms. It is more easy to inject 
anomalous data and force the system automatically 
adopts emergency procedure (e.g. shout-down), 
rather than be able to malicious introduce a 
dangerous sequence of command
 Masking a cyber/phisical attack, i.e. make the 
attach undetectable by the fault detection system 
(stealth attack)






How identify failures/attacks having a partial and limited
vision of the process in the presence of interdepenencies
and taking into account also the possible cyber-data
manipulation and cyber failure?
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
To roadmap (on working .)
1. Review of the most suited/innovative technologies for fault
detection/isolation in order to valuate their applicability into a distributed
framework scenario and to test their effectiveness/weakness w.r.t.
malicious attack
2. Review of the most relevant methodologies to improve situation
awareness (data fusion) applicable in a decentralised scenario
3. Review of the most cyber recent attack against critical infrastructure’s
monitoring system with a specific focus on those action performed to
avoid to trigger alarms (i.e. stealth attack) in order to identify
conditions/strategies able to hide the attack
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
To roadmap ( .to be done)
5. Development of (innovative) fault detection procedures specifically
designed for CI
6. Implement and validate w.r.t. a realisitc test bed scenario
4. Realise a cyber/physical test bed to be used for 
validation phase 
(but also to be shared as an ERNCIP facility )
UNIVERSITA' CAMPUS BIO-MEDICO DI ROMA
r.setola@unicampus.it
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Physical Testbed design
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Sensors reliability is of the utmost importance in control systems. Bad data caused by faults or 
physical/cyber manipulation can lead to unpredictable and sometimes dangerous 
consequences.
For example a wrong pressure value may cause physical damage to many system components, 
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Physica testbed is a part of FACIES testbed
Physical 
testbed
Simulated model (it 
forces changes in the 
physical system in 
accordance with the 
simulated dynamic)
PLC/SCADA system 
To simulate cyber attack
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online identification of Failure and Attack on 
interdependent Critical InfrastructurES
Proceedings of the CIPS II Workshop
Threat-Vulnerability Path Identification
for Critical Infrastructures Compilation
of a comprehensive all-hazards
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Risk Assessment and Development of
Protection Capacity for Critical
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• Grant:  584.975,30 € 
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1986  Prof. Dr.-Ing. H. P. Woelfel, TU Darmstadt, Mechanical Dynamics 
  Legal form GmbH + Co. KG, Emeritus 2006 
2000   Relocation HITech 
2009 Shareholder of Micromega S.A. 
















Experts for Vibrations, 
structural dynamics, acoustics  
• Wölfel is an European engineering company in structural dynamics 
• More than 800 projects in Europe, Asia and America per year  


















































Nuclear and Critical Infrastructure 
Load cases WBI is experienced in industrial projects as well as in R+D 
projects: 
• Earthquake 
• Airplane crash  
• Pressure waves 
 
Critical Infrastructure WBI has dealt with 
• Buildings 
• Plants and components 
• Control and communication systems 
 
Know-how of WBI: Protection of critical infrastructure 
• Vulnerability 
• Protection concepts 
































Structure of Bulgarian Atomic Forum 

















Technical Work 1 
Responsibility for Structures: 
• REL: Russian NPPs,  
• REL, NIGGG: dams 
• WBI: German NPPs 
 
Development of a methodology for the risk assessment of NPP and dams 
• General concept of risk assessment 
• Assessment method for NPP structures 
• State of the art of computational methods for aircraft impact 
• Further development of methods 
 FEM Models of the structures 
 FEM Models of planes 
 Material models for crash analysis 
 
Review of the hazardous CI structures 
• Lists of types of NPPs and dams 
• Classification of NPPs and Dams with regard to airplane crash 
 

















Technical Work 2 
Analysis of vulnerability of NPPs and dams 
• Basis for protection capacity against airplane crash 
 
 
Development of protection capacity against airplane crash of commercial 
passenger planes 
• high performance concrete  
• development of an additional shelter layers 
• additional obstacles in flight direction to structure 
 
 
Proof of different protection concepts by computational analysis 
 
No investigation of 
• Fire balls 
• Safety related components within the structures 
 
 

















Conferences and Workshops 
Participation in and contributions to international conferences 
• BULATOM 2012, 30th May – 1st June, 2012, Varna, at least 3 contributions 
• BULATOM 2013, end of May 2013, Varna, at least 3 contributions 
• SMIRT 22, 18. – 23,. August 2013, San Francisco, at least 3 contributions 
 
 
Specific Workshops in parallel to Bulatom 2012 and 2013 
• RiskProtec CI Workshop at BULATOM 2012, 1st June, 2012, Varna 
• RiskProtec CI Workshop at BULATOM 2013, end of May 2013, Varna 
 
New ! 
Contribution to IAEA Safety report series “Safety Assessment of NPP 
Structures against Human induced Events” 
 

















• D 1: report on method 
 
• D 2: list of vulnerable CI (dams, NPPs) and classification due to type and 
protection class report 
 
• D 3: protection capacity needed, report 
 
• D 4: protection capacity for CI including  publications 
 
• D 5: Participation in and contributions to international conferences 
- SMIRT 22, 2013, USA, at least 3 contributions 
- Bulatom 2012, Bulgaria, at least 3 contributions 
- Bulatom 2013, Bulgaria, at least 3 contributions 
 
• D 6: specific Workshops in parallel to Bulatom 2012 and 2013 
 

















M 1 31st August 2012:   
• methodology for the risk assessment of NPP and dams is developed 
• D1 is available 
 
M 2 31st August 2013: 
• list of vulnerable CI and classification due to type and protection class is 
compiled 
• D2 is available 
 
M 3 31st December 2013: 
• protection capacity against crash with commercial aircrafts is developed 
• D3 and D 4 is available 
 
















• Risk = Frequency of occurrence x Extent of damage 
 
• Risk = H x R x C 
• H = Frequency of occurrence (Hazard) 
• R = Conditional probability of failure (Resistance) 
• C = Extend of damage as a result of a Consequence analysis 
 
• Theory developed in earthquake engineering 
• Hazard quantification not in force for malevolent human acts and 
terroristic attacks 
 
• Attack with maximum probable parameters: mass and velocity 
 
General Concept of Risk Assessment 
 
















Variants of analysis of airplane crash 
State of the art, developed till 1989 
 
State of the art, developed since 2001 
 Load definition 
 Model of Airplane and NPP 
 Stability of structure 
 
 
















History of F-t-Function 
• Initial point for computing the F-t-Function is Riera‘s publication* of 1968 
describing the aircraft simplified with a mass-spring-system, hitting a rigid target 
• The analytical procedure is based in principle on a simple momentum equation, 
where the behaviour is defined by two parts 
*Riera: ‚On the Stress Analysis of Structures … ‘,Nuclear Engineering and Design, 1968 
2
cF P    
• For practical use the F-t Function was smoothed 
 = crushing force 
  = mass flow 
  = velocity 
















History of F-t-Function 
• First application scenarios of F-t-function within structural analysis 
appeared in Germany in the 70’ies due to of two facts: 
 Geopolitical situation within iron curtain between East and  
West -  high number of military jets located near the boarder 
 Problems within setup, handling and service of Starfighter 
caused several crashes with dramatic damages 
 
Crash of military jet in a urban residential district in Germany 

















 spallation     penetration scabbing     perforation 
  overall target response       punch type shear failure 
• There are two main types for the impact of missiles, depending on 
the stiffness relation between missile and target 
Hard Impact 
Soft Impact 
















Aircraft Crash – Sandia 
• In 1988 a crash of a military jet (Phantom F4) on a concrete slab was 
conducted at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque, New Mexiko, USA 
• The final velocity was 215 m/s, accelerated by rocket sled facility  
















Aircraft Crash – Sandia 
















Aircraft Crash – Sandia 
















Aircraft Crash – Sandia 
















• The goal was the experimental determination of the F-t-function 
• Accordingly the concrete wall was designed to be almost rigid, 
thickness 3.66 m, area 7m², weight 469 t   
























Aircraft Crash – Sandia 

















• Local analysis 
 perforation (using empirical equations) 
 local damage (shear, bending, punching) 
• Global analysis 
 stability (sliding, overturning)s 
 strength (design of stiffening elements) 
 displacements (contact to neighbouring structures) 
• Vibration analysis 
 floor response spectra 
 vibration of secondary structures (components) 
• Fire scenarios  
















Local Analysis - Damage 
• Simplified Mass-Spring-Damper-Model with two 2 DOF  
(shear and bending behaviour) 
• Input data is e.g. F-t-function out of test or Riera approach 
















Global Analysis – FE-Method 
FE-Model  
Sections FE-Model 



















































• As load case the F-t-function is used. The computation can be carried 
out as modal analysis based on the eigenfrequencies and –modes or 
using a direct integration scheme in the time domain 
• Reflecting real scenarios all possible impact areas are investigated 
• Final goal of the simulation is the computation of internal forces,  
displacement and accelerations, which are 
used for reinforcement design, component  
analysis…   
















• The impact of a military plane on a nuclear power plant has been a 
standard load case in Germany since the 1970ies 
•  Due to limited numerical capabilities the analysis has been divided 
(decoupled) into two steps: 
 Definition of the F-t-Function using the method of Riera* 
 FE-analysis of building with F-t-Function lumped over impact area 
• Since 9/11 the impact of a commercial aircraft came up 
• Due to differences within structural setup and dimensions of both 
plane types and  
 due to enhanced capabilities of numerical algorithms the analysis 
 can be performed in one step today 
→ integral analysis 
Motivation for new methods 
*Riera: ‚On the Stress Analysis of Structures subjected to Aircraft Impact Forces‘, 
 Nuclear Engineering and Design, 1968 
















Classification of commercial passenger aircrafts 
I. Weight > 330 t e.g.  A 380, B 747 and A 340 
II. Weight = 150 - 330 t e.g. A300 and B767 
III. Weight < 150 t e.g. A320 and B737 
 
Impact Velocity 
• 70 - 100 m/s (landing) hits close to the ground  
• 160 - 175 m/s  maximum for hits far from the ground 
• defined by national authorities 
 
Statistics Air Traffic 
• Statistics about aircraft classes 
• Distance to airports (weight reduction) 
Parameters Passenger Aircraft 
















































• Aim of the analysis is assessment of building 
• Only the main parts of the aircraft are considered: 
 Fuselage (incl. ribs and stringers), 
 Wings and tail (incl. Stringers and wing box) 
 Turbines with fixation 
 Fuel and payload, distributed 
 Front and main gear 
 
 
• Material description is nonlinear including plasticity, failure and 
strain rate dependence 
 
Modelling Setup of Passenger 
Plane 





































Validation by Sandia Tests F4 
• A validation of the simulation procedure by experimental results is for 
passenger aircraft not possible as no data exist 
• A principal validation can be carried out applying the procedure for the 
crash of the Phantom in comparison to the Sandia Tests 
















Modelling Setup Building 
• The crash analysis is carried out on a exemplary reactor building, 
without any soil effects, i.e. structure is fixed at the bottom 
Geometric dimensions: 
 height cylinder 30 m 
 radius cylinder 15 m 
 height Hemisphere 30 m 
 wall thickness 1.8 m  Impact Area 
• The wall setup is considered in detail with 
the concrete, the bending and shear reinforcement 
• The material definitions are nonlinear including failure and strain 
rate dependence:  Concrete  - Damaged Plasticity Model; 























Punching Test: Result Plate 
• Validation by VTT Tests within the IRIS-Benchmark 2010/2012 
• Shooting a Missile (v = 135 m/s) at a Concrete Plate 
• Comparison Test and Simulation via Damage, Displacement 

















• Animation for initial velocity of  160 m/s 
















Variants of Analyses 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
• The capabilities of numerical analysis open up a variety of new techniques 
• We shall concentrate at the integral crash analysis.This analysis type is 
mandatory, if the target is not rigid and plane and structure interact. This is e.g. 
the case if an obstacle in front of the structure prevents the plane to impact the 
structure. 
















First Results of Integral Crash 
Analysis 
 The local load distribution are different  
 F-t-approach applies lumped pressure over complete area 
 Integral approach has inhomogeneous pressure distribution (depending 
on the interaction between building and aircraft) – leads to higher local 
destruction 
 Load time functions are not conservative 





















• According the improved Soft-and Hardwaretechnologies the variety of analyses 
methods is enhanced by the integral approach. 
• With the integral approach a more exact analysis can be done concerning the 
parameters of the impact (flight angle, partly hitting the structure …)  
• With the integral approach the till now divided analyses types local, global and 
vibration are combined in one run.  
• Only with the integral approach non-rigid protection capacities can be 
investigated. 
• We shall develop and use the integral approach in the comming year of this 
reseach project. 
















Thank you for your Attention! 
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RAPID-N: A tool for mapping Natech
risk due to earthquakes
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DG JRC, EC
email: elisabeth.krausmann@jrc.ec.europa.eu
RAPID-N: A tool for mapping Natech 
risk due to earthquakes
S. Girgin, E. Krausmann
European Commission, Joint Research Centre





Hurricane, USA, 2005Earthquake, Turkey, 1999 Floods, Czech Republic, 2002 Earthquake, China, 2008
Chemical accidents include accidental oil and chemical spills, gas 
releases, and fires or explosions involving hazardous substances from 
fixed establishments (e.g. petrochemical, pharmaceutical, pesticide, storage 
depot), and oil and gas pipelines
Definition
A “Natech” accident is a “chemical accident” caused by a natural 
hazard or a natural disaster.
Earthquake, Turkey, 1999
Natural-Event Impact on Chemical Infrastructures
At least 40% of surveyed EU MS and OECD Member Countries have 
experienced one or more Natech accident, sometimes with fatalities and 
injuries, environmental or economic damage, or supply disruption
+ Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (Japan, 2011): multiple Natech accidents, 6 refineries halted 
shutting in 30% of refining capacity, major fires and explosions in 2 refineries;
+ Hurricanes Katrina & Rita (USA, 2005): 113 off-shore platforms destroyed, 163 severely 
damaged; hike in global oil price; release of 30 million litres oil onshore;
+ Kocaeli earthquake (Turkey, 1999): multiple fires in a refinery producing 1/3 of Turkey’s total oil- 
related output; international assistance required to cope with the accident.
Expected increase of Natech risk due to more hazards (climate change, industrialisation) 
and higher vulnerability of society (urbanisation, interconnectedness)
Earthquake, Turkey, 1999 5
Natech Risk-Reduction Situation
• Legislation, codes and standards for chemical-accident prevention 
rarely address Natech risk explicitly
• There is little knowledge on the dynamics of Natech accidents
• There are hardly any methodologies and tools for Natech risk 
assessment and no guidance for industry on how to assess Natech risk
• Emergency-response plans do not consider the characteristics of 
Natech accidents (loss of utilities)
• There are no Natech risk maps to identify areas at risk
 . from a JRC survey on the status of Natech risk reduction in the OECD and in EU MS
E. Krausmann, D. Baranzini (2012) Natech risk reduction in the European Union, J Risk Research 15(8): 1027-1047
Natech Risk Mapping
• Natech risk maps are considered a high priority need for:
 Identification of Natech prone areas (land-use planning)
 Emergency-response planning
• Hardly any Natech risk maps exist in the EU/OECD
 Simple overlay of natural hazards and industrial facilities
 Do not consider site-specific features
• Expected release scenarios
• Existing safety measures
	 Development of a unified Natech risk assessment and 




























Rapid Natech Risk Mapping Tool: RAPID-N
• Web-based application
 Multilingual
• Easy and quick data entry
• Rapid analysis and visualization
• No commercial packages
• Modular architecture
 Scientific Tools
 Natural Hazards and Natechs
 Facilities and Process Units
 Risk Assessment
• Current focus on earthquakes
Natural Hazards and Natechs Module
• Hazards
 Source parameters
• Earthquake Catalog Data
 Online monitoring (USGS, EMSC)
 Automated update of hazard data




 On-site hazard parameters
Scientific modules
Facilities and Process Units Module
• Facilities






 Process unit characteristics
 Stored substances
 Lumped process unit data
• Typical Process Units
 Process unit data substitute
Scientific modules
Risk Assessment Module 
• Damage Classifications
 Set of damage states
• Fragility Curves
 Damage probability vs. PGA
• Risk States
 Damage state
 Damage parameters, e.g.:
• Natech event (e.g. BLEVE)
• Conditional probability (e.g. 50%)





• Natech damage assessment
 Calculation of hazard parameters
 Estimation of damage probability using 
fragility curves
• Natech consequence analysis
 Estimation of (worst-case) 
consequence scenarios
 Calculation of end-point distances 








• Statistics and curve-fitting
• Fuzzy arithmetic
• Automated unit conversion
• Mapping
 Google Maps
 GIS analysis library
Support module
Property Estimation Framework
• Minimize data requirement
• Increase flexibility
 No hard-coded functions
Property Estimation Framework
• Generic framework
 Natural hazard properties (e.g. PGA)
 Site properties (e.g. Soil class)
 Process unit properties (e.g. Volume)
 Substance properties (e.g. Density)
 Facility properties
• Fixed value or complex function
• Location-aware





• RAPID-N features a web-based, 
integrated framework for Natech 
risk assessment and mapping 
(for earthquakes)
• RAPID-N allows rapid 





 Preliminary Natech damage 
estimation
• Current status:
 Release phase (expert validation)
 Included data (from open 
sources)
• > 18,500 earthquakes
• > 7,300 earthquake maps
• > 5,500 industrial facilities (only 
for internal use)
Future Work
• Automated Natech damage and consequence estimation (Alert)
 E.g. Automatic warning of authorities by the JRC
• Consideration of risk receptors (population)
• Extension to other natural hazards
 Floods
• Extension to other industrial facilities
 Pipelines
Proceedings of the CIPS II Workshop
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Development of a Risk Assessment and
Resilience analysis platform by the JRC







A GIS-based federated platform for 
resilience and risk assessment of critical 
infrastructure networks 
Georgios Giannopoulos*, Bogdan Dorneanu, Olaf Jonkeren  
 
Joint Research Centre 
Security Technology Assessment Unit 
A platform for harmonized risk and resilience 
assessment of CIs: CIR2 
High Level 
Objectives 
Propose a platform for harmonized risk and 
resilience assessment of critical infrastructures at 
regional, national or international level 
Assess infrastructures at asset and/or at systems 
level 
Establish a community of researchers and policy 
makers that can exchange information, 
simulations and best practices in a harmonized 
and consistent way 
Respond to the high level requirements of the 











What do we want to offer? 
A system that can be both available online or as 
standalone version but with federation capabilities 
Seamless federation of different models over a 
common infrastructure 
Both a research tool for model validation as well as 
a production tool that can be used for CI risk and 
resilience assessment 






















WebServer:  Apache 
Java server:  Tomcat 
Desktop GIS:  Quantum GIS  
Server GIS:  Geoserver on Tomcat 
Database:  PostgreSQL/PostGIS 
 
Programming 
Server side:  PHP, Python, Java 
Client side:  Javascript (OpenLayers, GetExt) 
Data input: Several possibilities 
Using data stored in an existing database 
• Geospatial information for selected infrastructure can be 
stored in the system 
• The user may decide which part of the data to use 
• Authentication required (In principle very limited data will be 
stored in the system) 
Uploading data remotely into an existing database 
• Data will be uploaded to the system database for the 
processing stage using a file (most common GIS Formats) 
Creating data for the processing “online” 
• Data will be digitized using the web interface and then passed 
to the processing modules without storing them in any 
database 
Access to an existing database: local or external 
Access to the existing database: Selection of a 
subset 
GIS file upload 
The user may upload 
his/her own GIS file 
Perform assessments 
using this data and the 
modules that will be 
plugged-in to the 
system 
Save the data into the 
database to make it 
available to the other 
users or just delete 
them 
Digitize the grid using maps/satellite images “on-
the-fly”  
Online processing 
Visualize networked infrastructures for which there is no 
available database 
Create additional dependencies layers (e.g. functional) 
between elements of different networked infrastructures for 
which databases already exist (stored or uploaded) 
Enabling emergency management: Possibility to modify 
the links between assets and infrastructures “on the fly” 
and according to the evolution of an emergency. 














WebServer:  Apache 
Java server:  Tomcat 
Desktop GIS:  Quantum GIS  
Server GIS:  Geoserver on Tomcat 
Database:  PostgreSQL/PostGIS 
 
Programming 
Server side:  PHP, Python, Java 
Client side:  Javascript (OpenLayers, GetExt) 
Example of MATLAB / GIS federation 
Criticality 
analysis 
A module has been 
developed in 
Matlab and has 
been plugged-in to 
the system 
Evaluation of all 
nodes affected by 
a node disruption 
Example of MATLAB / GIS federation 
Vulnerability 
analysis 
A module has been 
developed in 
Matlab and has 
been plugged-in to 
the system 
Evaluation of all 
nodes that may 
affect the 
operation of one 
node 





Exchange of analyses, information, data 
etc. on the basis of a common platform 
Possibility to post requests for analyses 
that may be undertaken by the research 
community 
Possibility to upload documents and other 
scientific material linked to an asset, an 
infrastructure or a region and make it 
available to the rest of the community 
Associate incident reports and other 
documentation to assets and 
infrastructures 


















•  Input from policy makers on the analysis needs 
•  Input to the scientific community to develop the necessary 
modules and analysis tools 
•  JRC facilitates the interface and interoperability of modules 
as well as the development of certain analysis modules. 
•  Developed so far: 
•  Structural analysis of networks 
•  Criticality of nodes 
•  Vulnerability of nodes 
•  Clustering coefficients 
•  Minimum path 
•  Reconfiguration of networks due to disruption on the basis of 
structural characteristics 
•  Systems engineering - dependencies and interdependencies 
•  Economic impact of CI disruption using I/O modeling 
Bogdan Dorneanu*, Roberto Filippini, Olaf Jonkeren, Georgios Giannopoulos 
 
Joint Research Centre 





Critical Infrastructure Resilience Assessment 
The Systems Engineering Component 
Outline 
•  Methodology 
•  Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
 
•  Model implementation 
•  Future work 
Methodology 
•  Combined systems engineering - economic inoperability input-
output model (SE- (D)IIM) 
•  SEM 
•  Analysis of system’s performance 
degradation and/or recovery 
•  Single Critical Infrastructure 
•  Cross-sector Critical 
Infrastructures 
•  (D)IIM 
•  Estimates economic losses 


















Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Automatic extraction of 
network topology (geo 
referenced) from the GIS 
(single or multiple CI) 
Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Automatic extraction of 
network topology (geo 
referenced) from the GIS 
•  Assignment of the network 
functional dependencies 
•  Model parameters 
•  Buffering time 
•  Recovery time 
•  Network reconfiguration 
•  … 
Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Injection of the disturbance in 
one or more nodes 
 
Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Injection of the disturbance in 
one or more nodes 
•  Result – perturbation 
propagation determined by 
the (inter)dependencies 
among the network nodes  
Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Cross-sector CI’s 






Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Cross-sector CI’s 
•  A disturbance affects a 








Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Cross-sector CI’s 
•  A disturbance affects a 
particular node and 
propagates 
•  Each node may fail after a 






Systems Engineering model (SEM) 
•  Cross-sector CI’s 
•  A disturbance affects a 
particular node and 
propagates 
•  Each node may fail after a 
time to failure 
•  Each node may recover 





Model implementation in Simulink 
•  Automatic model building 
using the GIS topology 
•  Model parameters inserted 
through the GIS 
•  Two types of nodes  
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































•  Modelling network’s behavior using a dynamic inoperability 
input-output approach 
•  Development of node behavior library of models for failure and 
recovery rates based on 
•  Network type 
•  Threat type 
•  Introduction of model parameters through GIS layer 
•  Interoperability with GIS layer in order to recognize the type of 





Critical Infrastructure resilience assessment 
The economic component 
Olaf Jonkeren*, Bogdan Dorneanu, Georgios Giannopoulos  
 
Joint Research Centre 
Security Technology Assessment Unit 
Model 
Goal: estimate economic losses following from infrastructure failure 
 
Requirements model: 
•  27 EU countries 
•  Economic resilience 
•  Focus on CI’s and KRSC’s 
•  Input from SE model 
•  Treat ‘workforce’ as a CI 
•  All infrastructure approach 
•  All hazards approach 
•  Include indirect effects/ interdependencies 
The basis: Input-Output model 
•  Impact assessment method  
 Aims to map out the direct and indirect consequences of an initial 
 impulse into an economic system across all economic 
 sectors. 
•  Depicts the system-wide effects of an exogenous change 
in a relevant economic system. 
•  Output measured in terms of economic losses: value (€) 
of lost production. 
 
The basis: Input-Output model 
Input-Output transactions table 
The basis: Input-Output model 




•  degree of disfunction of an industry/CI (0-1) 




1 Model estimates how an initial failure spreads in an economic 
system (a system of CI’s and KRSC’s). 
2 Degree of failure translated in economic losses.  
Interoperability Input – Output Model 
Inputs needed (simple example): 
 
•  Size initial inoperability in directly affected infrastructure (from 
technological model) 
•  Matrix with interdependencies 
•  Column with industrial output 
Outputs (simple example): 
 
•  Inoperability levels 
•  Economic losses 
vs.   
Interoperability Input – Output Model 
Economic Resilience 
IIM extended with resilience aspects to make it dynamic (DIIM).  
 
Economic resilience: ‘the ability of a CI or system of CI’s to mute 
losses’. 
 
Two types of economic resilience: 
•  Restorative resilience: speed of recovery of industries after 
event. 
•  Absorptive resilience: ability of a CI to mute inoperability 
following a disruptive event. 
Economic Resilience 
Restorative resilience 
Makes the model dynamic because evolution of inoperability and 
economic losses over time are modeled. 
Economic Resilience 
Restorative resilience 




Enables the model to analyse effect of preparedness initiatives 
(presence of inventory, redundancies e.g.)  
Data 
Source for I-O data: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
http://www.wiod.org/ 
 
•  National data on annual economic output 
•  National data on interdependencies 
•  27 EU countries 
•  35 industries (including CI’s and KRSC’s) 
Data 







































Data discussed: for economic loss analyses on national level. 
What about the regional level? 
 
Using national and regional employment data > economic outputs 
and interdependencies can be estimated for the regional level > 
facilitates economic loss analyses on regional level. 
 
Relevance: 
•  Knowledge on economic loss distribution within a country 
•  More detailed GIS representation 
•  Facilitates analyses for cross-border regions 
Future work 
•  Allow existence of a non-recovery period in post-disaster phase 
•  Allow interdependencies to change over time (inter-industry 
resilience). Disequilibrium > changes in A* matrix. 
•  Perform probabilistic analyses > output is a range of economic 
losses instead of a point estimate. 
Application of model: Italian CI failure 
CI outage time Regional 1 day economic output (M€) 
Regional 1 day 
economic loss (M€) 
Application of model: Italian CI failure 
Comparison Static IIM – Dynamic IIM results 
 
Economic losses (million €) for 11 CI industries only 
Model Industry Italy North Centre South Sicily 
IIM 1-11 58.90 18.34 18.45 14.51 7.60 
DIIM 1-11 16.07 7.13 4.29 3.06 1.59 

Summary economic model 
European Commission 
EUR 25747 EN – Jo int Research Centre – Institute for Protection and Security of the Cit izen 
Title: CIPS II workshop on research projects financed under the CIPS specific programme 
Authors: Georgios Giannopoulos 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
2012 – 193 pp. – 21.0 x 29.7 cm 
EUR - Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1831-9424 
ISBN – 978-92-79-28183-9 
doi:10.2788/79113 
Abstract 
The CIPS projects are financed by DG HOME within the framework of the specific programme «Prevention, Preparedness and 
Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related risks». JRC-IPSC organizes for a second time a dedicated
workshop for these projects. The audience of this workshop is composed from researchers, policy makers and national
authorities. Bringing together these competences is of instrumental importance in order to steer research projects towards policy
makers needs and provide to the policy makers the latest research trends in the domain of Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
  
 
As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy
cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and 
sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food 
security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security
including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
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